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“Never let a good crisis go to waste,” Winston Churchill
I. Introduction
The Fukushima nuclear power plant disaster, which occurred seven
years ago in March 2011, sent waves of shock throughout the world.
The disaster was triggered by an earthquake and tsunami, two
natural disasters of extraordinary scale, one in a century and in a
millennium, respectively, in this region of Japan. Yet, it may have
been surprising that such a disaster could have happened in Japan, a
country known for its science and technology, engineering and high
educational attainment.
The failure that accounted for the disaster and its aftermath was one
of governance rather than of technology and engineering. The
regulatory and legal framework that allowed this failure of
governance was found to be toothless and ineffective due to
collusion between the nuclear industry, ministries and regulators of
the Government of Japan. The National Diet of Japan Fukushima
Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission (NAIIC),
of which author Dr. Kiyoshi Kurokawa served as Chairman,
concluded that this man-made disaster was a case of regulatory
capture, in which the Japanese nuclear regulatory agencies, agencies
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of the Government, served the interests of the nuclear power
industry, instead of protecting the safety of the public.
Since the Commission published its final report and submitted its
recommendations to the National Diet in July 2012, little progress
of significance can be observed. Major problems at the Fukushima
plant have yet to be resolved, such as leakages of radioactive
substances into the environs and the Pacific Ocean and the search
and plan for nuclear core meltdown debris are yet to be seen, while
the bigger issues of governance, such as lack of transparency and
openness are also ongoing.
In September 2012, the regulatory bodies at the time of the accident,
the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) and the Nuclear
Safety Commission (NSC), were replaced by the Nuclear
Regulatory Authority (NRA), now under the Ministry of the
Environment. Unfortunately, this has not been making significant
progress, only amounting to cosmetic changes. Thus, the NRA has
not demonstrated sufficient independence or transparency. I have
personally heard the accounts of many internationally recognized
experts who have stated that Japanese nuclear safety requirements
remain inferior to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
standards.
In spite of much reason to doubt the effectiveness of the reforms,
more nuclear power plants are currently on track for approval to
NSA restarted. At the time of writing this article, four nuclear
reactors were in operation: Units 1 and 2 of the Sendai Power Plant
in Kagoshima Prefecture, which came back online in 2015,1 and
Units 3 and 4 of the Takahama Power Plant, which were restarted in
20162 and after a temporary shutdown, 3 allowed to operate again in

1

Press Release, The Kyushu Electric Power Co., Inc. (Kyuden), Return to
Commercial Operation of Sendai Nuclear Power Unit No. 2 (Nov. 17, 2015)
http://www.kyuden.co.jp/en_information_151117.html
[https://perma.cc/8JS42Z4C].
2
At the Takahama Power Plant, Unit 3 was restarted on January 29, 2016 and
Unit 4 on February 26, 2016. However, they were temporarily taken offline after
Unit 4 experienced an automatic shutdown just a few days later on February 29.
Subsequently, the Otsu District Court issued an injunction halting their operation.
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2017.4 A further nineteen reactors have applied to the NRA to be
approved for restarting operations. In Saga Prefecture, the Genkai
plant, Units 3 and 4, are expected to be restarted later in 2017.5
Genkai Unit 3 started March 23rd, 2018, but stopped one week later
due to leakage of water pipeline.
To understand the reasons for the lack of significant progress in
policy reforms, it is necessary to go beyond the legal changes and
examine the underlying institutional factors. Doing so exposes the
reality that the structures of regulatory capture6 are still firmly
maintained. This paper first reviews the work of the NAIIC
investigation and then examines issues with the regulatory
framework of the nuclear industry in Japan. It then delves into the
institutional factors and societal background that laid out the
groundwork for the nuclear disaster to occur. It argues that in
addition to greater reform of safety regulations, the mindset shared
by many Japanese that underlies many organizations in Japan must
undergo major change to transform into one that encourages more
diversity and upholds the obligation to dissent. Above all, the
principles of responsibility and accountability to the public must be
followed on individual and institutional levels to corporate and the
government. If such changes are not made, another Fukushima
disaster may happen again. In an increasingly globalizing world,
the international consequences of national crises are tremendous—
risking reputations of nations, those involved in nuclear industry
and policy, and beyond. In order to avoid facing another
3

Press Release, The Kansai Electric Power Co., Inc. (KEPCO), Takahama Unit 4
Automatic
Reactor
Trip
(Feb.
29,
2016)
http://www.kepco.co.jp/english/corporate/pr/2016/__icsFiles/afieldfile/2016/02/2
9/2016_feb29_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/5E6B-SRMJ].
4
Press Release, The Kansai Electric Power Co., Inc. (KEPCO), Decision on
petition of appeal pertaining to temporary restraining order against provisional
disposition order pertaining to demand of injunction preventing resumption of
operation of Units 3 and 4 of Takahama Nuclear Power Station (Mar. 28, 2017)
http://www.kepco.co.jp/english/corporate/ir/brief/pdf/2017_mar28_2.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2KCM-4XKE].
5
World Nuclear News, Court ruling clears path for restart of Genkai units (Jun.
13, 2017) http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/RS-Court-ruling-clears-path-forrestart-of-Genkai-units-1306174.html [https://perma.cc/LSJ5-JJAV].
6
George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 The Bell J. of Econ. 3,
(1971).
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catastrophe, we must not let this crisis go to waste and must apply
the lessons learned.
II. The Mandate and Principles of NAIIC
NAIIC was the first parliamentary independent investigation
commission since Japan became a constitutional democracy. In
order to ensure the independence of the legislative, executive and
judicial branches of the Government, commissions of this kind that
investigate significant state matters are a regular part of many
democracies. However, NAIIC was ground-breaking, as it was the
first in Japan. The establishment of NAIIC and the selection of its
ten commissioners were mandated by the National Diet, through a
law enacted on September 30, 2011. The Commission officially
began its investigation on December 8, 2011 and submitted its
report7 to both Chairs of two Houses of the National Diet on July 5,
2012, in “approximately six months” as stipulated by the law. The
law mandated the Commission with “the legal power to request the
submission of relevant documents and the power to request the Joint
Council of the Houses of Representatives and Councilors to invoke
parliamentary investigation rights”.8
The Commission was based on the principles of transparency and
commitment to the people, the future and the world. There were
nineteen Commission meetings, which held hearings with thirtyeight key individuals, and which all held press briefings that were
7

Along with the official Japanese report, NAIIC submitted the Executive
Summary written in English which describes the key points of the full report
(Main Report) to the global audience. In October 2012, the entire English
translation of the full report was released. Both the Executive Summary and the
Main Report are available in pdf format on the NAIIC website, http://naiic.org
[https://perma.cc/5L5H-T3EL]. The Main Report is split into chapters and
readers can access each chapter in pdf or html form. NAIIC, Reports (Sept. 12,
2012),
http://warp.da.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/3856371/naiic.go.jp/en/report/
[https://perma.cc/FH8F-JVU2].
8
NAIIC, THE OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL DIET OF JAPAN
FUKUSHIMA NUCLEAR ACCIDENT INDEPENDENT INVESTIGATION
COMMISSION [hereinafter NAIIC Report], Introduction 6 (2012),
http://warp.da.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/3751543/naiic.go.jp/wpcontent/uploads/2012/08/NAIIC_Eng_Introduction_web.pdf
[https://perma.cc/NE3G-TCHZ].
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open to the public and media and were broadcast online with a
simultaneous English translation. In addition to the nineteen
meetings, NAIIC conducted approximately 900 hours of interviews
and hearings with more than 1,000 people. It conducted surveys
with responses from more than 10,000 evacuees and 2,400 plant
workers, held three town hall meetings and made visits to nuclear
plants and three research missions overseas.
The NAIIC Report was made available online in both English and
Japanese, as well as a book published by Tokuma-Shoten.
Additionally, a short video animation series9 explaining the NAIIC
investigation and report in both languages was created by university
students, which can also be viewed online.
III. Findings of the NAIIC Report: Regulatory Capture
The main findings of the investigation were the underlying
structures of regulatory capture in the nuclear power sector in Japan.
The Commission examined the relationship between the operators
and regulators and concluded that the two main regulatory bodies,
NSC and NISA, failed to carry out their responsibilities of
developing and enforcing safety requirements to protect the public.
Fearing that new regulatory requirements would interfere with their
operations and weaken their position in lawsuits, TEPCO opposed
them by lobbying the regulators and government through the
Federation of Electric Power Companies (FEPC).
But fundamentally, the lack of autonomy from industry interests
was built into both organizations from the start. NISA, the main
regulatory agency, lacked independence due to its ill-fated
establishment as an organization originally a part of the Ministry of
Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), which actively promoted the
nuclear power industry.10 Similarly, NSC, the advisory body
9

See NAIIC, Home (Oct. 31, 2013), http://naiic.net/en/ [https://perma.cc/SF4S2X45] (containing illustrated videos explaining what happened in the Fukushima
nuclear accident).
10
NAIIC
Report,
Chapter
5,
52,
http://warp.da.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/3856371/naiic.go.jp/wpcontent/uploads/2012/08/NAIIC_Eng_Chapter5_web.pdf
[https://perma.cc/W3PX-JB8Q].
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responsible for creating the nuclear safety guidelines, was first set
up as part of the Science and Technology Agency (STA), an
organization established in the 1950s to help promote the nuclear
industry in Japan. NSC neglected to establish legally obligatory
safety regulations.
The investigation found that NISA failed to carry out its
responsibilities of enforcing utility companies to adhere to nuclear
safety regulations. NISA gave tacit consent to allow the operators
to choose voluntarily whether to apply countermeasures against
severe accidents, including external events.
Crucial to the
Fukushima accident, although NISA required nuclear operators to
conduct seismic safety assessments (called “seismic back-checks”)
and submit reports to them on the status of the nuclear power plants,
they did not require operators to retroactively apply new regulatory
requirements to existing plants (the so-called “back-fitting” system).
The legal framework to enforce back-fitting was simply never put in
place, by regulators, ministries or government. Thus, even as
international safety standards progressively changed, old nuclear
power plants in Japan could avoid updating their safety levels,
leaving them vulnerable to earthquakes and other natural disasters.
The consequences of the lack of regulatory enforcement culminated
in the Fukushima accident. NISA and METI required seismic backchecks to be held at the Fukushima nuclear power plant after NSC
revised the 1981 “Regulatory Guide for Reviewing Seismic Design
of Nuclear Power Facilities” in 2006. Following this, in 2009,
TEPCO submitted interim reports that showed Units 1 through 4 at
the Fukushima nuclear power plant had extremely limited seismic
safety facilities. However, TEPCO did not release any further
reports, making an internal decision to extend the deadline for the
final report from June 2009 to January 2016. NISA was aware of
the need to conduct anti-seismic structural reinforcement
recommended by the revised guidelines on the facilities. Yet, NISA
tacitly consented to the delay of the further back-checks and left it
to the discretion of TEPCO to decide whether to implement the
reinforcements. Indeed, the Commission investigation found that
the reinforcements had not been implemented in Units 1 through 3
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in the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant.11 In this sense, the
negligence and collusion of the regulator and industry produced a
precarious situation, providing the foundation for the man-made
disaster to occur.
Although based on indirect evidence, the Commission suggested
there was a possibility that the earthquake caused significant
damage in Unit 1 of the Fukushima Daiichi power plant before the
tsunami. In contrast, TEPCO has claimed that the damage was
caused by the tsunami, which they could not have foreseen and
therefore could not have done more to prevent the accident.
However, as Japan is a country that is particularly prone to
earthquakes, it would be prudent for the authorities to seriously
consider this possibility for all other nuclear power plants in Japan.
The Commission recommended that a third party should continue to
investigate this issue.
Moreover, NSC guidelines were lenient and neglected to provide
regulatory requirements for cases of severe accidents. Accordingly,
in its list of safety risks to consider, TEPCO omitted the risk of a
severe accident. Specifically of importance to the Fukushima
accident, the guidelines did not consider the possibility of a
prolonged blackout of a nuclear power station. Reflecting this,
TEPCO’s manual for the emergency response to a severe accident
did not have instructions for the case of a prolonged station blackout
and power loss scenarios.12 This negligence was fatal, as it was a
blackout in the nuclear power station that was the first step in the
long chain of events in the Fukushima nuclear catastrophe.
Additionally, NSC also did not consider other issues such as the
security of nuclear power plants and the spent-fuel stockpile, which
are an obvious target for terrorists through physical and cyberattacks. Overall, as the NAIIC Report concluded,
11
Id. at 4; NAIIC Report, Executive Summary, 16 (2012),
https://www.nirs.org/wp-content/uploads/fukushima/naiic_report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/S4C5-D78V].
12
NAIIC
Report,
Chapter
1,
38,
http://warp.da.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/3856371/naiic.go.jp/wpcontent/uploads/2012/08/NAIIC_Eng_Chapter1_web.pdf
[https://perma.cc/45ML-C4JR]; NAIIC Report, Executive Summary, supra note
11, at 33.
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Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO), as the
nuclear operator, the Nuclear Safety Commission
(NSC) and the Nuclear and Industrial Safety
Agency (NISA) as the regulatory authorities, and
the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry
(METI), as the government body promoting
nuclear power, all failed to correctly prepare and
implement the most basic safety requirements . . .
13

IV. Policy Recommendations by NAIIC and Responses by
Governmental Agencies
Based upon its findings, NAIIC provided policy recommendations
on the legal and regulatory aspects involving the operation of
nuclear power, as well as on governance and crisis management.
The seven recommendations are listed in the Appendix A to this
paper. Regarding legal reform, NAIIC recommended that an
integrated legal framework be established in order to avoid the
confusion of multiple laws and government agencies. The laws
must define the roles of the nuclear operators, require regular and
timely reviews as well as “back-fitting.” The Commission also set
out criteria for new regulatory bodies to follow, including a high
degree of independence, transparency, requirement for regulatory
bodies to report to the National Diet on their decision-making
processes and the prohibition of stakeholder involvement.
Furthermore, it recommended the National Diet to monitor the
nuclear regulatory agencies by calling them to explanatory hearings
to the Diet, tracking their progress and implementation of the
recommendations.
After the NAIIC Report was submitted to the National Diet in July
2012, governmental bodies were prompted to introduce some
changes but they have been formalities at the minimum required
level. The NRA, now under the Ministry of the Environment, was
established to replace NISA and NSC in September 2012.
Additionally, some laws were amended in June 2012 to include new
13

NAIIC Report, supra note 8, at 10.
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regulatory requirements on nuclear safety, which went into effect in
July 2013. These requirements introduced the “back-fitting”
system, measures against terrorism, and combined some nuclear
safety regulations (the Electricity Business Act, for periodic
inspections, was incorporated into the Reactor Regulation Act)14.
Although the most pressing and basic amendments were made, there
has been little monitoring by the National Diet and interest in
reforms has largely disappeared. After the submission of the NAIIC
Report, the House of Representatives of the Diet has only called
upon Commission members to speak at a hearing on one occasion.
Moreover, the House of Councilors has yet to take substantial
action. Thus, the National Diet has done little to monitor the new
regulatory agency. In his book 3.11: Disaster and Change of Japan
(2013), Professor Richard Samuels, who specialises in Japanese
politics, argues that few signs of change can be seen in politics and
general democratic processes in Japan since the Fukushima
disaster.15 One positive development was that in May 2017, I was
appointed the Chairman of the Advisory Board of the Special
Committee of seven memberes on the Investigation of Nuclear
Power Isssues in the House of Representaties as recommended by
NAIIC report.16 Yet, this is just the beginning of a long process and
much more work need to e done.
Moreover, a review of the NRA in January 2016, conducted by the
IAEA, deemed that the nuclear safety law needed to be amended to
make on-site safety checks more effective. In the review, the IAEA
also inspected Japanese nuclear facilities, including the Fukushima
plant. The leader of the mission, Philippe Jamet, a French
regulatory commissioner, stated that the inspection rules at Japanese
nuclear facilities were inflexible and did not allow a quick response
in case of a problem. At a press conference, Jamet said that Japan
has a comprehensive framework but, “it doesn't give enough
freedom for the inspectors to react immediately and to provide
14

Nuclear Regulation Authority, New Regulatory Requirements for Light-Water
Nuclear
Power
Plants—Outline
2
(August
2013),
http://www.nsr.go.jp/data/000067212.pdf [https://perma.cc/DEQ3-ME96].
15
RICHARD J. SAMUELS, 3.11: DISASTER and CHANGE in JAPAN (2013).
16
NAIIC Report, supra note 8.
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results . . . At any time and for any plant, inspectors should be
allowed to go where they want.”17
Japan has a responsibility to the international community for
upholding the highest levels of safety and transparency in regulating
its nuclear power plants. As nuclear power plant accidents such as
Fukushima and Chernobyl have proved, nuclear power has farreaching consequences not only for the country, but for the world.
Especially as globalization progresses, unexpected, black swan
events can have larger impacts and risks. The construction of
nuclear power plants is increasing, particularly in emerging
economies such as China, Turkey and even the United Kingdom.
Thus, it is ever important to establish and monitor regulatory
structures, through which we can avoid the same mistakes and
networks of collusion as occurred in Japan. As Winston Churchill
once stated, “Every crisis should be an opportunity,” and we must
apply the lessons learned from the Fukushima disaster to avoid
future crises.
Moreover, it is not only international and governmental
organizations that should be involved but also the public, which
should have a heightened sense of awareness of these significant
issues. Civil society can play an important role, not only in the
aftermath of crises, but on the everyday level, in being critical of
their governments and upholding the obligation to dissent, which I
will explain in the next section.
V. Context of Institutional Culture in Japan
In order to understand how the regulatory capture of the nuclear
industry in Japan was formed, the context of the institutional and
societal factors in Japan must be explained. In the chapter on the
Fukushima disaster in his excellent book, Bending Adversity, David
Pilling writes accurately, “the accident exposed in a flash—quite
17

Mari Yamaguchi, U.S. News, “The International Atomic Energy Agency says
Japan has improved its nuclear safety regulation since the 2011 Fukushima
disaster, but it still needs to strengthen inspections and staff competency” (Jan.
22, 2016, 6:55 AM), http://www.usnews.com/news/science/articles/2016-0122/iaea-japan-nuclear-regulation-should-improve-skills-law
[https://perma.cc/4CJZ-2N6G].
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literally—some of the worst traits of ‘old Japan,’ with its elitist and
secretive bureaucratic culture. That culture had served Japan
reasonably well in the post-war years when it was driving economic
catch-up. But it was deeply flawed.”18 In this section, I describe
the context of mindset behind the strong adherence to maintaining
hierarchical social structures and promoting organizational interests,
which, in this case, were prioritized over protecting the lives of the
Japanese public.
In the postwar period from 1945, Japan achieved remarkable
economic growth, overtaking West Germany to become the second
largest economy after the United States as early as 1968. In 1979,
an American scholar, Ezra F. Vogel, published Japan as Number
One Lessons for America19 in order to warn US business leaders and
policymakers about this new global economic competitor. Yet, the
book became a bestseller and more widely read in Japan than in the
US, hitting the sweet spot of the Japanese psyche, which had longed
to catch up with the West since the Meiji Restoration. They had
now not only caught up, but had surpassed the West. However,
amongst some this pride was accompanied by complacency and
arrogance. The inertia of the postwar successes became widespread.
Institutional collusion and negligence by nuclear regulatory
agencies fostered the safety myth of nuclear power, exacerbated by
the groupthink mindset. Japan serves as a prime example of why
upholding the obligation to dissent within organizations is crucial to
maintaining a healthy democracy—and how its absence can be fatal
in times of national crisis.
After World War II, Japan was able to reach high levels of
economic growth through the Iron Triangle of government, industry
and bureaucracy, as well as academia and media. The tightly knit
system of Japan Inc. enabled the defeated country to concentrate its
energies into one national effort and contributed greatly to Japan’s
economic success. The idea of a rich country and strong army that
drove the Meiji government to militarize was refocused on
economic growth and building up export-led industries. METI and
18

DAVID PILLING, BENDING ADVERSITY: JAPAN AND THE ART OF SURVIVAL 260
(2014).
19
EZRA F. VOGEL, JAPAN AS NUMBER ONE LESSONS FOR AMERICA (1979).
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its predecessor MITI (Ministry of International Trade and Industry)
took industrial policies that successfully promoted automotive
manufacturing and steel production. Japanese companies worked
together by maintaining close horizontal and vertical ties through
the keiretsu system, in which a main bank provided finance,
companies held cross-shareholdings and kept close ties with
suppliers. Within corporations, the salarymen enjoyed the stability
of lifetime employment, so long as they fit neatly within the
seniority-based hierarchy and toed the company line.
As Japanese companies, such as Toyota, quickly rose to become
major competitors to global businesses, many scholars and
intellectuals tried to understand the distinctive elements of Japanese
organizations and culture that allowed them to reach such levels of
success. In MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of
Industrial Policy, 1925-1975, Chalmers Johnson explained that
Japan’s cultural values and ways of conducting business and trade
was fundamentally different from Western ones.20 In Cartels of the
Mind Japan’s Intellectual Closed Shop, an American scholar
describes the insular perspective of the Japanese intellectual
establishment.21 Karel Van Wolferen, a journalist and expert on
Japanese affairs, provided similar analyses in The Enigma of
Japanese Power: People and Politics in a Stateless Nation22 and
Ningen-o-kōfuku-ni-shinai-nihon-to-iu-shisutemu [False Realities of
a Politicized Society].23
A Japanese scholar of Sociology, Chie Nakane, wrote scholarly
books on the hierarchical social relations and ordering of Japanese
organizations, such as Tate-shakai-no-ningen-kankei [Japanese
Vertically Structured Society] and Tate-shakai-no–rikigaku

20

CHALMERS JOHNSON, MITI AND THE JAPANESE MIRACLE: THE GROWTH OF
INDUSTRIAL POLICY, 1925-1975 (1982).
21
IVAN P. HALL, CARTELS OF THE MIND JAPAN'S INTELLECTUAL CLOSED SHOP
(1998).
22
KAREL VAN WOLFEREN, THE ENIGMA OF JAPANESE POWER: PEOPLE AND
POLITICS IN A STATELESS NATION (1989).
23
KAREL VAN WOLFEREN, NINGEN-O-KŌFUKU-NI-SHINAI-NIHON-TO-IUSHISUTEMU [FALSE REALITIES OF A POLITICIZED SOCIETY], (Masaru Shinohara
trans., 1994) (Japan).

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol13/iss2/2

2018]

59

[Dynamics of Vertical Society],24 pointing to the social structures of
collective behavior as restraining individuality and the potential for
Japanese to play dynamic roles on the international stage, in areas
other than economics. Even earlier, Ruth Benedict published The
Chrysanthemum and the Sword (1946),25 based on her study on
Japan during WWII. Originally conducted to gather information on
the behavior of Japanese for the U.S. Office of War Information, her
influential study outlined concepts such as obligation and shame in
Japanese society that became the starting point for many subsequent
studies on Japan.
Others have made observations on a larger scale, classifying Japan
as an entity in itself. In his controversial theory of clashing
civilizations, Samuel P. Huntington even deemed Japan as being
one out of “seven or eight major civilizations” of the world, which
he argued was “defined both by common objective elements, such
as language, history, religion, customs, institutions, and by the
subjective self-identification of people.”26
VI. Groupthink Mindset
Categorizing Japan as a having its own civilization may be extreme.
However, it can be said that, as with all societies, there are many
norms in Japanese society which have been taught and learned over
generations and have developed out of a particular historical and
social context. In the case of Japan, many of the encouraged norms
of social behavior happen to coincide with some elements of
groupthink, a term coined by Yale University psychology professor,
Irving L. Janis27. Inspired by the term doublethink, which was used
by George Orwell in his dystopian novel, 1984,28 as the act of non24

CHIE NAKANE, TATE-SHAKAI-NO-NINGEN-KANKEI [JAPANESE VERTICALLY
STRUCTURED SOCIETY] (1969) (Japan); CHIE NAKANE, TATE-SHAKAI-NO–
RIKIGAKU [DYNAMICS OF VERTICAL SOCIETY] (1978) (Japan).
25
RUTH BENEDICT, THE CHRYSANTHEMUM AND THE SWORD: PATTERNS OF
JAPANESE CULTURE (1946).
26
Samuel
P.
Huntington,
1993
(Summer), "The
Clash
of
Civilizations?," FOREIGN AFFAIRS 72(3):22-49.
27
IRVING L. JANIS, GROUPTHINK: PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES OF POLICY DECISIONS
AND FIASCOES (1982).
28
GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 (1949) (U.K.).
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critically believing in two contradictory ideas, Janis used groupthink
to explain the phenomenon of rationalized conformity in decision
making within political and corporate circles. The corporate culture
of relative cohesiveness and insularity that tended to be fostered
through the postwar Japanese model of employment in mammoth
corporations and governmental organizations made people more
prone to the groupthink mindset of discouraging dissent and
criticism.
In Japan, many social norms and activities tend to revolve around
the organization to which one belongs, particularly based on
university education and employment. The lifetime employment
model and the seniority system, common to Japanese companies
and bureaucracies, incentivize employees to spend most of their
adult life in one organization. Even if lifetime employment is no
longer guaranteed in Japan’s recession economy, most employers
still assume that employees are willing to dedicate a lifetime of
work to their organizations.
On the everyday level, such behaviors can be observed in social
interactions. For example, when people introduce themselves
amongst other Japanese at a dinner or social event in Tokyo, the
first words exchanged are often the names of their companies, along
with carefully presented business cards, before their names or
professions. The expectation is that the company and one’s position
within it comes first, rather than one’s profession or field. In
contrast, at international social gatherings in places such as New
York or London, people would more likely mention their names and
professions first, followed by their companies or organizations and
institutions at which they work. Peer pressure to conform is a core
part of organizations in Japan, and this behavior is taught at an early
age, starting even in kindergarten.
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Figure 1—Comparison of the Order in Japan and Many Western
Countries
As illustrated in the image above, Figure 1,29 in Japan, many people
are likely to view themselves in relation to the organizational
structure to which they belong, while in other countries, people may
tend to identify themselves by their individual professions and
display greater risk-taking and competitive behavior. It could be
said that in Japan inequality is less prevalent but there are also fewer
chances for individuals to jump to the top. The company-centered,
rigid job market also makes it more difficult for people to have a
diversified career with experience working in multiple
organizations. Even a mid-career engineer with a high level of
expertise would face difficulties in moving between Japanese
companies. In most companies, there are also close relations
between labor unions and company management. These norms and
institutional pressures can function as binding mechanisms that
inhibit employees from stepping out of line with the company’s
direction and views.
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In the Japanese nuclear power sector, it is arguable that this mindset
was widespread in the nuclear villages and made it more acceptable
for employees and people involved in the nuclear industry to
prioritize the industry’s bottom line over public safety. In addition
to the formal collusion between the regulators and operators, the
social and institutional norms were significant underlying factors
that provided the groundwork for the manmade disaster of
Fukushima to occur
Let’s be clear on one point—this does not mean that culture must be
static. On the contrary, it is of utmost importance to critically
question these norms, into which most people have been socialized
from an early age. The combination of collusion, negligence by
those in positions of power and a long history of institutional norms
surely increased the likelihood that such an accident would happen
in Japan on March 11, 2011. But I raise these points not merely as a
defeatist commentary on Japan’s woes, but as a call for change and
a plea to individuals to be more critical, to dissent when necessary
and to save the nation from another crisis.
VII. Responsibility for the Accident: Institutions and
individuals
In the final report of the Commission, specific individuals were not
singled out to take the blame for the accident. However, this was
not in order to let those in power off the hook. I will examine the
problem of the lack of individual responsibility and accountability
shortly. But first, I must clarify that the intention of the
Commission was to draw attention to the startling fact that Japan
lacked a comprehensive plan for crisis management. A crisis
management plan is a basic requirement that any country utilizing
nuclear power must establish, particularly one that is prone to
earthquakes and other natural disasters. No investigative body had
pointed to this gaping hole, nor scrutinized the institutional features
of the regulatory framework and crisis management guidelines.
The responsibility of the individual leaders must be pursued, but the
lack of a national strategy must also be pointed out. These are two
different points, both of which are significant, but require separate
inquiries. This Commission focused on the institutional elements.
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The Executive Summary of the NAIIC Report states, “The
underlying issue is the social structure that results in ‘regulatory
capture,’ and the organizational, institutional, and legal framework
that allows individuals to justify their own actions, hide them when
inconvenient, and leave no records in order to avoid
responsibility.”30
In this way, the Commission deemed that if the structures of
regulatory capture are not reformed, new individuals could easily
fill the positions of authority and make the same mistakes as their
predecessors.
From the perspective of crisis management,
regardless of who the individual leaders are, there must be a set of
comprehensive plans that can be implemented at any moment in
time. Especially at the national level, it goes without saying that
crisis management must be carefully planned by those with expert
knowledge and experience.
I will mention though, the investigation did find and conclude that,
especially in the critical period immediately after the accident,
individuals at the top levels in the government, TEPCO and NISA
failed to take the necessary steps to prevent or limit the damage.
The Act on Special Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency
Preparedness designated NISA as the main organization to take the
lead in crisis situations, but it quickly became clear that they had no
such capabilities and were unprepared and dysfunctional. The
Prime Minister’s Office stepped in, but in doing so, broke the
planned chain of command and caused confusion, while failing to
declare a state of emergency immediately or informing the public of
the severity of the accident. The President of TEPCO did not even
conduct the basic task of reporting to the Prime Minister’s Office,
the activities and intentions of the operators at the plant. In no way
does the NAIIC Report ignore the wrongdoings or waive the
responsibilities of these individuals.
VIII. The Lack of Accountability and Transparency
This leads to an important point about the accountability of
governmental and corporate leaders in Japan. The lack of
30
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transparency in the decision-making processes of the government
and relevant bodies during the Fukushima accident has cost them
the trust of the international community. In any organization, the
greater authority must come with the greater responsibility and
accountability. Unfortunately, the meaning of accountability was
lost in translation when imported into the Japanese language. The
English word accountability is translated as the responsibility to
explain in Japanese, which does not convey the same level of
seriousness.
In English, the meaning of accountability goes one step beyond
responsibility, signifying the act of carrying out the responsibility
that comes with the role. In How the Mighty Fall And Why Some
Companies Never Give In31, Jim Collins also indicates the
significance of the meaning and implications of accountability.
Often in Japanese organizations, after major corporate or political
scandals, those at the top are able to placate critics by fulfilling the
responsibility to explain, consisting of apologizing and bowing at
press conferences. The problems are soon swept under the carpet
only to remain unresolved. This too, was the case after the
Fukushima accident.
Kiyoshi Yamamoto explores the concept of accountability and how
the meaning was lost in his academic work, Akauntabiriti-wokangaeru-dōshite-“setsumeisekinin”-ni-natta-noka [Thinking about
Accountability—Why It Became “Responsibility to Explain”].32
Similar to Professor Chie Nakane, he discusses the vagueness of the
role of responsibility within Japanese social and power structures.
He argues that the Fukushima nuclear accident and WWII were
typical cases in Japan, in which responsibility was vague and never
pursued. Furthermore, he asserts that the disciplinary aspect of the
word accountability is rarely used in the Japanese translation. He
31
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draws attention to the sharp contrast between how accountability is
viewed by leaders in the United States and in Japan. To indicate the
importance attached to accountability in governance in the US, he
gives examples such as the renaming of the General Accounting
Office, which is under the authority of Congress, to the Government
Accountability Office in 2004.
He goes on to examine accountability in Japanese society, taking
into consideration the particular elements of the social fabric. Issues
in Japanese society, such as the Fukushima nuclear disaster, the
Olympus scandal33 , and bullying in Japanese schools prompted Mr.
Yamamoto to study this topic. In recent years, a slew of corporate
scandals in Japanese firms have emerged, from Toshiba which
inflated net profit figures to Kobe Steel which falsified certifications
on the strength of its metals.34 These scandals and others,35 reflect a
corporate culture in which the difficulty to criticize superiors leads
to issues being swept under the carpet, with little transparency or
accountability.
VIV. Overcoming Groupthink and Reforming Corporate
Culture
For the true meaning of accountability to be accepted and for reform
to take place in Japan, the groupthink village mentality that has
dominated corporate and institutional culture must be changed. I
have tried to raise awareness of the need to change this mindset by
speaking about the Fukushima nuclear power plant disaster and the
findings of the Commission. The obligation to dissent is extremely
important in any organization, whether in the private or public
sector. Rather than taking the passive attitude that nothing can be
33
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changed, it is critical to express one’s opinions regardless of one’s
age and position. In the book, Winning,36 Jack Welch, the President
and CEO of GE, has also pointed out the obligation to dissent as a
significant element of corporate culture for successful companies.
Changing one’s mindset is also important for positive growth for
both businesses and individuals. A 2017 McKinsey study touched
upon the effects of norms and mindsets in the office on performance
and growth. It showed that cultural norms and perceptions had a
significant effect on employees’ ability to implement new business
strategies in digital technology. Even employees’ skill levels in
digital technology mattered less for their performance compared to
their attitudes and behavioral norms. One suggestion for building a
new corporate culture, according to the study, is to hire senior level
people from outside of the company to ‘’help inject disruptive
thinking that is a source of innovative energy and
empowerment.’’37This could be a key first step in the road to
changing attitudes and overcoming groupthink.
Some people who visit Japan from abroad are surprised by the
stability of Japan despite many decades of recession and the 2011
nuclear and natural disasters.
Indeed, the Japanese public,
particularly those whose homes were destroyed after March 11,
have shown incredible strength and endurance. But, if there are
major accidents or problems in the future in other areas, Japan will
likely make the same mistakes again, become isolated and lose the
trust of the international community. In times of crisis, the fragility
of the antiquated structures of Japanese society will be exposed with
little to hold them up. As Anthony Fitzsimmons and Derek Atkins
observe in their book, Rethinking Reputational Risk, How to
manage the risks that can ruin your business, your reputation and
you, ‘’Typically a crisis has multiple root causes, often systemic,
that remained unrecognized and unmanaged but gradually
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accumulated, unnoticed over years. . . .’’38 Leaving these decaying
pillars as they are will allow more crises like Fukushima will arise,
in other areas and sectors. I can only hope that each and every one
of the Japanese public will consider this seriously and have a
heightened awareness of Japan’s future.
X. Lessons from Fukushima: Crisis to Opportunity
It has been seven years since the devastating tragedy of the March
11 earthquake and tsunami and the Fukushima nuclear power plant
disaster. Japan must seize the opportunity to change and to be
responsible to its public and to the international community. The
historical and social context of Japan made it well-positioned for
such an accident to occur, but the structures of groupthink and
collusion can form in many places around the world. In terms of
governance, the lessons from the disaster can be applied to many
areas where the lack of transparency may be an issue. Moreover, as
more nuclear power plants are being built around the world, the
lessons from Fukushima must be applied and the knowledge gained
must be harnessed in order to prevent future nuclear disasters.
Finally, this independent Commission can serve as a model for
future investigations to probe issues of significance to the everyday
lives of Japanese citizens. Having served as the chairman of the
first independent investigation commission mandated by parliament
in Japan (and the only one to date), it is my sincere hope that the
democratic spirit of the Commission will continue, through the
individual awareness and actions of the Japanese people.
Note: This paper is based on presentation and discussion by Dr.
Kurokawa at the conference held by the University of Pennsylvania
Law School, Center for Asian Law on November 19 and 20, 2015.39
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Appendix A
The Commission’s Seven Policy Recommendations 40
1. “Monitoring of the nuclear regulatory body by the National
Diet: A permanent committee to deal with issues regarding
nuclear power must be established in the National Diet in
order to supervise the regulators to secure the safety of the
public.”
2. “Reform the crisis management system: A fundamental
reexamination of the crisis management system must be
made. The boundaries dividing the responsibilities of the
national and local governments and the operators must be
made clear.”
3. “Government responsibility for public health and welfare:
Regarding the responsibility to protect public health, the
following must be implemented as soon as possible. (1) A
system must be established to deal with long-term public
health effects, including stress-related illness. Medical
diagnosis and treatment should be covered by state funding.
Information should be disclosed with public health and
safety as the priority, instead of government convenience.
This information must be comprehensive for use by
individual residents to make informed decisions. (2)
Continued monitoring of hotspots and the spread of
radioactive contamination must be undertaken to protect
communities and the public. Measures to prevent any
potential spread should also be implemented. (3) The
government must establish a detailed and transparent
program of decontamination and relocation, as well as
provide information so that all residents will be
knowledgeable about their compensation options.”
4. “Monitoring the operators: TEPCO must undergo
fundamental corporate changes, including strengthening its
governance, working towards building an organizational
culture which prioritizes safety, changing its stance on
information disclosure, and establishing a system which
40
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prioritizes the site. In order to prevent the Federation of
Electric Power Companies (FEPC) from being used as a
route for negotiating with regulatory agencies, new
relationships among the electric power companies must also
be established—built on safety issues, mutual supervision
and transparency.”
5. “Criteria for the new regulatory body: The new regulatory
organization must adhere to the following conditions. It
must be: Independent . . . Transparent . . . Professional . . .
Consolidated . . . Proactive . . . ”
6. “Reforming laws related to nuclear energy: Laws concerning
nuclear issues must be thoroughly reformed.”
7. “Develop a system of independent investigation
commissions: A system for appointing independent
investigation committees, including experts largely from the
private sector, must be developed to deal with unresolved
issues, including, but not limited to, the decommissioning
process of reactors, dealing with spent fuel issues, limiting
accident effects and decontamination.”
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Appendix B
Japanese Blue Chip Companies Involved in Recent Scandals41
1. 2011 Olympus Corporation: accounting fraud
2. 2015 Toyo Tire & Rubber Co., Ltd.: falsified performance
data for earthquake resistant products
3. 2015 Toshiba Corporation: inflated net profits by $1.3bn
over a seven year period
4. 2015 Asahi Kasei Construction Materials Corp.: falsified
data on building foundation piles
5. 2015 Takata Corporation: misrepresented inflator data
6. 2016 Mitsubishi Motors Corporation: inflated fuel economy
data by up to 15 percent
7. 2016 Suzuki Motors Corporation: fuel economy testing
methods were not compliant with Japanese domestic
standards
8. 2017 Nissan Motor Company Ltd.: domestic car inspections
carried out by unqualified technicians
9. 2017 Subaru Corporation: domestic car inspections carried
out by unqualified technicians
10. 2017 Kobe Steel, Ltd.: gave false certifications to its metals
and products
11. 2017 Toray Industries, Inc.: data falsification for tires and
various auto parts
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